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4	 See	Friedrich	A.	von	Hayek,	The Constitution of Liberty	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1978)	at	205	
[Hayek].
5	 These	norms	of	legality	differ	according	to	the	specific	area	of	law.	The	principle	of	legality	in	criminal	law,	
for	example,	includes	the	prohibition	against	retroactive	criminalization	or	ex post facto laws	as	well	as	the	
void	for	vagueness	doctrine	with	respect	to	provisions	within	criminal	statutes.	On	the	relationship	between	
the	rule	of	law	and	vagueness	in	constitutional	law,	chiefly	in	the	criminal	law	area,	see	Marc	Ribeiro,	Limit-
ing Arbitrary Power: The Vagueness Doctrine in Canadian Constitutional Law	(Vancouver:	University	of	Brit-
ish	Columbia	Press,	2004).
II.	 The	Rule	of	Law	in	Theory	 81















In	 the	 Diceyan	 model,	 Parliament	 was	 sovereign	 and	 supreme.	 Parliament	 was	 the	
source	of	all	ordinary	 law7	and	ought	 to	be	 the	 source	of	all	governmental	power.	Any	
power	that	was	not	authorized	by	Parliament,	or	had	acted	beyond	the	powers	delegated	to	
it,	would	be	considered	ultra	vires	by	the	courts.	This	meant	that	administrative	law	played	











tion	 worsened	 when	 it	 became	 clear	 that	 Parliament	 could	 no	 longer	 provide	 proper	
	oversight	of	administrative	agencies	in	the	modern	state	through	regular	legislative	scrutiny	
or	through	political	practices	centring	on	ministerial	responsibility.






































•	 Laws	must	be	capable	of	being	performed.	We	are	not	obliged	 to	obey	 laws	com-
manding	the	impossible.
•	 Congruence	between	the	rules	as	announced	and	the	rules	as	applied	must	exist	in	or-
der	 to	 avoid	 a	 legal	 system	 composed	 of	 arbitrary	 commands.	This	 last	 principle	
deeply	informs	discretionary	decision-making	in	the	administrative	state.





















































15	 Joseph	Raz,	 “The	Rule	of	Law	and	 Its	Virtue,”	 in	The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality	








































18	 Raz, The Authority of Law,	supra	note	15	at	223-26,	228.
19	 In	contrast	to	Fuller,	Raz	does	not	agree	that	deviations	from	the	rule	of	law	cannot	be	total	or	radical,	or	that	
there	must	necessarily	be	some	moral	value	in	a	legal	system	committed	to	the	rule	of	law.



















therefore	conceived	of	administrative	 law	as	 the	means	 through	which	 the	courts	could	

























22	 For	a	contrary,	radical	argument,	see	Robin	West,	Re-imagining Justice: Progressive Interpretations of For-

















litical	moderation,	 the	maintenance	of	order,	 political	 liberty,	 and	 the	prevention	of	 the	
abuse	of	power	by	all	branches	of	government.	Canada’s	Westminster	system	of	govern-













requirements	 for	 independence	 in	 the	 administrative	 state—given	 executive	 control	 of	
	administrative	bodies—strong	analogies	exist.	But	just	as	courts	cannot	treat	administrative	








24	 For	discussion	of	 the	 separation	of	powers	 in	 constitutional	 jurisprudence,	 see	Newfoundland (Treasury 
Board) v. N.A.P.E.,	[2004]	3	S.C.R.	38;	Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education),	[2003]	3	
S.C.R.	3;	Cooper v. Canada (Human Rights Commission),	[1996]	3	S.C.R.	854	[Cooper];	Wells v. Newfound-








26	 Cases	that	specify	these	three	conditions	include	R. v. Valente, [1985]	2	S.C.R.	673;	Beauregard v. Canada,	































































































































































ence	cases:43	the	Manitoba Language Rights Reference44	and	the	Secession Reference.45
40	 For	further	discussion	of	written	and	unwritten	constitutions,	see	supra	note	23	and	accompanying	text.
41	 Preamble	to	the	Constitution Act, 1867	(U.K.),	30	&	31	Vict.,	c.	3,	reprinted	in	R.S.C.	1985,	App.	II,	No.	5.









tinction	between	reference	opinions	and	other	 judicial	opinions	 is	 the	 limited	range	of	remedies	 that	are	
available	to	the	judiciary	in	reference	cases.	See	Hogg,	supra	note	35	at	8.6(d).
44	 Reference re Language Rights Under s. 23 of Manitoba Act, 1870 and s. 133 of Constitutional Act, 1867,	
[1985]	1	S.C.R.	721	[Manitoba Language Rights Reference].
45	 Reference re Secession of Quebec,	[1998]	2	S.C.R.	217	[Secession Reference].
III.	 The	Supreme	Court	of	Canada	on	the	Rule	of	Law’s	Significance	 91

























lature	and	government.”52	 In	Canada,	 the	people	have	elected	 to	be	governed	 through	a	
democracy,	its	institutional	forms,	and	its	political	ideals.	Democracy	and	parliamentary	
sovereignty,	 then,	 are	 related	but	not	 synonymous.	Moreover,	Canadians	have	also	em-































































































58	 British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.,	[2005]	2	S.C.R.	473	[Imperial Tobacco].
59	 Charkaoui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),	2007	SCC	9	[Charkaoui].
60	 British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Christie,	2007	SCC	21	[Christie].













set	out	in	the	Immigration and Refugee Protection Act	(IRPA).	The	Court	held	that	the	stat-
utory	scheme	violated	s.	7	principles	of	fundamental	justice,	ss.	9	and	10	guarantees	against	



















63	 But	see	Authorson v. Canada (Attorney General),	[2003]	2	S.C.R.	40,	both	for	troubling	insights	into	how	
an	executive-controlled	government	can	manipulate	and	avoid	the	manner	and	form	requirements	of	enact-
ing	legislation,	and	for	a	tragic	example	of	a	systemic	failure	of	accountability.
64	 Imperial Tobacco, supra	note	58	at	para.	66.
65	 This	is	clear	in	the	Charkaoui	decision	where	express	provisions	of	the	Charter were	used	to	strike	down	



















































































tion	alone	 is	 an	unsatisfactory	method	of	 ensuring	access	 to	 justice	because	“haphazard	and	fluctuating	
principles	concerning	this	matter	[standing]	can	produce	a	broken	and	arbitrary	pattern	of	correspondence	









haus	underscores	the	significance	of	judgments	like	Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigra-










































eds., Inside and Outside Canadian Administrative Law	(Toronto:	University	of	Toronto	Press,	2006)	at	421.
































these	 services,	 “it	 cannot	 simply	 invoke	 administrative	 convenience	 and	 vague	 funding	












Lecture	 in	Wellington,	 New	Zealand,	December	 1,	 2005,	 online:	 <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/aboutcourt/	
judges/speeches/UnwrittenPrinciples_e.asp>.	
82	 See,	for	example,	the	discussion	by	the	majority	in	the	Court	of	Appeal	of	British	Columbia	of	the	principle	
of	the	rule	of	law	in	relation	to	the	principle	of	access	to	justice.	Christie v. British Columbia,	2005	BCCA	
63.	The	Supreme	Court	rejected	this	line	of	argument	in	its	decision	discussed	above.












































spected	 the	 expertise	 and	 policy	 choices	 of	 various	 administrative	 agencies	 and	 boards	
while	 simultaneously	 recognizing	 the	 legitimacy	and	effectiveness	of	parallel	bodies	of	
justice	such	as	administrative	tribunals.	Administrative	law	therefore	served	a	crucial	func-
tion	by	establishing,	over	time,	a	relationship	between	courts	and	government	departments	





















































Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal).90	The	Canadian	Import	Tribunal	conducted	an	
inquiry	into	the	importation	of	corn	grain	from	the	United	States	into	Canada,	an	inquiry	





corn	growers.	The	Federal Court Act,92	however,	allowed	for	 judicial	review	if	a	board,	
commission,	or	tribunal	had,	among	other	grounds,	“based	its	decision	or	order	on	an	erro-
neous	finding	of	fact	that	it	made	in	a	perverse or capricious manner	or	without regard for 
the material before it.”93	Because	the	Tribunal’s	decision	was	based	on	a	factual	finding	of	




























which	 had	 to	 interpret	 a	 poorly	worded	 provision	 in	 its	 enabling	 statute	 concerning	 the	
meaning	of	the	word	“employee.”	The	legislation	stated	that	the	employer	could	not	replace	
striking	 employees	with	 other	 employees;	moreover,	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 statute	 excluded	
management	from	the	definition	of	employee.	The	representative	union,	the	Canadian	Union	
of	Public	Employees,	complained	to	the	Board	that	the	employer	was	replacing	striking	em-
ployees	 with	 management	 personnel,	 contrary	 to	 the	 statute.	 The	 Board	 examined	 the	














Wilson	 J.	 clearly	 feared	 that	 such	 a	wide-ranging	 and	probing	 examination	of	 both	 the	
































































































































2. The Choice of the Standard of Review
We	have	also	seen	that	pre-Charter	administrative	law	was	limited	to	the	review	of	ques-












ence	 and	 expertise	 within	 these	 administrative	 bodies,	 regulates	 the	 contours	 of	 the	
	administrative	 state	 and	 its	 exercises	 of	 power,	 and	 controls	 the	 discretionary	 features	
within	the	exercise	of	judicial	review.	Whether	the	ideal	succeeds	in	practice,	however,	is	

























migration	officer’s	 biased	decision	 in	 the	 context	of	 a	humanitarian	 and	 compassionate	





















































































structurally	 and	 purposively	mirrored	 courts	 possessed	 the	 jurisdiction	 to	 hear	 Charter	
claims.	Now,	sometimes	the	enabling	legislation	will	empower	an	administrative	tribunal	





















ence	as	 respect”	 institutional	model.	This	democratically	 informed	perspective	emerged	
clearly	in	the	dissent	written	by	McLachlin	J.	(as	she	then	was)	and	L’Heureux-Dubé	J.	in	












































114	 Two	significant	texts	for	this	argument	are	Dworkin’s	A Matter of Principle	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	Uni-
versity	Press,	1985)	and	Law’s Empire	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	1986).	As	a	legal	phi-





Dworkin,	“Liberalism”	in	A Matter of Principle	at	191.






































of Law: Ideal or Ideology	 (Toronto:	Carswell,	1987);	Jeremy	Waldron,	Law and Disagreement	 (Oxford:	
Oxford	University	Press,	1999);	Christopher	Manfredi,	Judicial Power and the Charter: Canada and the 
Paradox of Liberal Constitutionalism,	2d	ed.	(Toronto:	Oxford	University	Press,	2001);	and	Ran	Hirschl,	
Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism	(Cambridge,	MA:	Har-
vard	University	Press,	2004).
118	 See,	for	example,	Wilson	J.’s	characterization	of	s.	1	of	the	Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms	(the	








The	specific	nature	of	 this	 joint	effort	 in	governance	 is	controversial.	Though	 liberal	
democratic	theory	emphasizes	that	no	branch	of	government	should	possess	complete	con-
trol	of	 sovereignty,	disputes	 rage	about	whether	public	power	 should	be	 shared	equally	
among	the	state	institutions	or	whether	one	branch	should	retain	overall	supremacy.120	In	









Political	 sanctions	manifested	 themselves	 through	 regular	 elections	 as	well	 as	 political	
conventions	such	as	ministerial	responsibility	in	which	Cabinet	ministers	faced	demands	
for	accountability	by	way	of	scrutiny	in	question	period.































































































tive	 law—a	 restraint	 that	 simultaneously	 attempts	 to	 ensure	 judicial	 accountability	 and	
larger	public	law	accountability.
125	 In	a	new	and	significant	case,	the	Supreme	Court	invoked	rule-of-law	values	and	attributes	to	justify	restructur-
















Allan,	T.R.S. Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law	(Oxford:	Oxford	
University	Press,	2001).
Bauman,	Richard	W.,	&	Tsvi	Kahana,	eds.	The Least Examined Branch: The Role of Legis-
latures in the Constitutional State	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006).
Bellamy,	Richard,	 ed.	The Rule of Law and the Separation of Powers	 (Aldershot,	UK:	
Ashgate/Dartmouth,	2005).
Craig,	Paul	P.	Administrative Law,	5th	ed.	(London:	Sweet	&	Maxwell,	2003).
Dworkin,	Ronald.	A Matter of Principle	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	1985).
Dyzenhaus,	David,	ed.	Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order	(Oxford:	
Hart,	1999).




Mullan,	David.	Administrative Law: Cases, Text, and Materials,	5th	ed.	(Toronto:	Emond	
Montgomery,	2003).
Saunders,	Cheryl,	&	Katherine	Le	Roy,	eds.	The Rule of Law	 (Sydney:	The	Federation	
Press,	2003).
Shapiro,	Ian,	ed.	NOMOS XXXVI: The Rule of Law	 (New	York	and	London:	New	York	
University	Press,	1994).
Tamanaha,	Brian	Z.	On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory	(Cambridge,	UK:	Cam-
bridge	University	Press,	2004).
CaSeS
British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd.,	[2005]	2	S.C.R.	473.
Cooper v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission),	[1996]	3	S.C.R.	85.
National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal),	[1990]	2	S.C.R.	1324.
Reference re Language Rights Under s. 23 of Manitoba Act, 1870 and s. 133 of Constitu-
tional Act, 1867,	[1985]	1	S.C.R.	721.
Roncarelli v. Duplessis,	[1959]	S.C.R.	121.
